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Zoning and Police Power Measures for
Historic Preservation: Properties of
Nonprofit and Public Benefit Corporations
TERENCE H. BENBOW* AND EUGENE G.
McGUIRE**
Landmark preservation zoning is one of the principal tools
currently used for preserving historic landmarks. The authority
underlying such zoning requires that it apply equally to all
landmarks, whether owned by individuals, profit-making corpo-
rations, or nonprofit public benefit corporations. Certain issues,
however, that arise from the application of historic preservation
zoning to specific landmarks must be analyzed somewhat differ-
ently depending upon whether the property involved is owned
by a public benefit organization or by a profit-making corpora-
tion. This paper deals with the following major issue: when does
the application of a zoning ordinance in this context constitute
an invalid taking in violation of the fifth or fourteenth
Amendments?
There is no longer any question as to whether local govern-
ments have the power to enact landmark preservation ordi-
nances restricting an owner's right to alter his property. It is
now firmly established that the protection of cultural, historical,
aesthetic and architectural assets is an aspect of the public wel-
fare that the states are empowered to protect pursuant to the
police power.' It is equally well established that landmark pres-
ervation ordinances that restrict an owner's ability to change the
landmark and that require that landmarks be properly main-
tained are a valid means of exercising this aspect of the police
power.2 Such statutes apply with equal validity both to property
owned by nonprofit institutions and to property owned by
profit-making corporations.3 It is also clear that, although the
courts are reluctant to invalidate a landmark preservation ordi-
nance in its entirety,4 the courts are willing to hold that the ap-
plication of an otherwise valid landmark preservation ordinance
to a specific piece of property is invalid if the use of the property
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is so restricted as to constitute an uncompensated taking.,
There is an inevitable tension between the application of
the police power to limit the use an owner may make of his
property and the dictates of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments that "no person shall ... be deprived of. . . property
without due process of law" nor "shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation. '7 In a certain
sense, any restriction on the use of private property deprives the
owner of some aspect of his property and amounts to a partial
taking.
The restraints of the fifth and fourteenth amendments,
however, have generally been held not to preclude the enact-
ment of regulations which limit the use of private property and
thereby decrease the value of that property.' Rather, the fifth
and fourteenth amendments have been held only to prohibit the
application of restrictions upon property which are so onerous
that the owner is constructively prevented from beneficially us-
ing the property.9 In that instance, the application of the regula-
tion is held to violate the fifth and fourteenth amendments by
being "confiscatory" and by constituting a taking both without
due process of law and without payment of just compensation.1"
The courts have not decided exactly where to draw the line
between permissible regulation and regulation that constitutes
an invalid taking. The Supreme Court conceded in its recent
landmark decision, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City, that "[t]he question of what constitutes a 'taking' for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of
considerable difficulty,"" that "th[e] Court has been unable to
develop any 'set formula' for determining when [regulation be-
comes a taking, and that in each instance the question has been
resolved by] essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries. '1 2
Despite the admitted confusion of the law regarding the is-
sue of when the regulation of a landmark becomes a taking and
the paucity of decisions on this point involving property owned
by nonprofit corporations, the existing decisions can be mar-
shaled to support the following proposition: the standard which
should govern ordinances regulating property owned by non-
profit institutions is that the application of such ordinances is
valid unless the restrictions prevent or seriously interfere with
the nonprofit corporation's carrying out its charitable purpose.
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This standard was first announced by the Appellate Division of
the New York State Supreme Court in Trustees of Sailors' Snug
Harbor v. Platt." The standard was later adopted by the New
York Court of Appeals in Lutheran Church in America v. City
of New York' 4 and has been acknowledged by the courts of other
jurisdictions.'5 Although the Court of Appeals applied the fore-
going test very restrictively in Lutheran Church in America v.
City of New York, other decisions can be used by analogy to
argue both that the formulation announced by the New York
courts should be applied liberally to uphold landmark designa-
tions and that the formulation should control in all
jurisdictions.""
There is a dearth of authority, however, involving property
owned by public benefit corporations. Therefore, in applying a
landmark preservation ordinance to property owned by a public
benefit corporation, the issue of where the line should be drawn
between an application which is a valid exercise of the police
power and one which is void as an unconstitutional taking can
best be analyzed by examining the decisions dealing with all
types of zoning ordinances and property, not just those involving
landmark preservation ordinances and property owned by non-
profit corporations.
The courts have taken a liberal approach toward defining
the point at which the application of a zoning ordinance,
whether it be a landmark preservation or a traditional zoning
ordinance, becomes an unconstitutional taking. The test that
has developed in the context of commercial property is that an
ordinance is invalid as applied only if the owner is precluded
from putting his property to any use for which it is reasonably
adapted.1 7 Although this test is somewhat vague and extremely
flexible, it usually has been applied to uphold the implementa-
tion of zoning ordinances.
The application of zoning ordinances to commercial prop-
erty is generally not held to be void merely because the owner is
prevented from putting his property to the use that would pro-
duce the highest economic return if he is allowed to put the
property to some reasonable use."8 For example, in Maher v.
City of New Orleans," the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit upheld the application of the New Orleans
Vieux Carr6 historic preservation ordinance" even though the
19811
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effect was to deny a property owner permission to tear down a
small cottage on his property and replace the cottage with a
larger building containing seven rental apartments. The court
specifically noted that "the police power does not become an un-
constitutional taking merely because, as a result of its operation,
property does not achieve its maximum economic potential."21
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead22 provides an even more dra-
matic example of the foregoing philosophy. In that case, the Su-
preme Court upheld the application of an ordinance that pro-
hibited excavating below the water table on land that for many
years had been used as a gravel mine even though the result of
that application of the ordinance was that the owner was forced
to discontinue his gravel business. In this instance also, the Su-
preme Court reiterated the general rule that "the fact that [an
otherwise valid ordinance] deprives the property of its most ben-
eficial use does not render it unconstitutional. '23
Similarly, the application of zoning ordinances to commer-
cial property has been upheld where the value of the property is
significantly decreased, but not completely destroyed.'
Hadacheck v. Sebastian25 is the classic example of such a case.
In Hadacheck, the Supreme Court upheld the application of a
zoning ordinance which effectively prohibited the continued op-
eration of a brickyard, thereby reducing the value of the prop-
erty from $800,000 to $60,000. Citing Hadacheck, the Supreme
Court recently reaffirmed that a reduction in property value
does not amount to a taking where the property is left with some
reasonable use.'
In the case of commercial property, the property's ability to
produce a reasonable return on investment provides a readily
available test for determining whether the regulation has de-
prived the owner of all reasonable use of his property. This test
has been legislatively adopted in statutes such as the New York
City Landmarks Preservation Law which provides that the own-
er of a designated landmark is entitled to relief if he can estab-
lish that his property is incapable of earning a six percent return
while complying with the restrictions imposed by the landmark
designation.27 In line with the liberal philosophy that has char-
acterized the analysis of when zoning regulation constitutes a
taking, it has been held that the test is whether the landmark
could produce a reasonable return if it were put to any use per-
[Vol. 1:635
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mitted by the applicable regulation, not whether the existing use
was producing a reasonable return.28 Furthermore, if the rele-
vant ordinance provides economic relief for a landmark, such as
a reduction in taxes, the court looks to see if the property is
capable of producing a reasonable return after any applicable re-
duction in taxes or the granting of other relief 2 9 Such relief is
not compensation for a taking pursuant to the fifth and four-
teenth amendments, but is a factor which, by allowing the prop-
erty to produce a reasonable return as regulated, prevents the
regulation from becoming a taking requiring compensation.3
Both the foregoing liberal policy that has developed in the
application of zoning ordinances to commercial property and the
general principle that regulation does not constitute a taking if
there remains any reasonable use to which property may be put
should govern the application of zoning ordinances, including
historic preservation ordinances, to property owned by nonprofit
corporations.
Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platts1 is an important
case addressing the issue of when the application of a preserva-
tion ordinance to property owned by a public benefit corpora-
tion constitutes a taking in violation of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. In that case the New York State Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, announced the rule that the application of a
landmark preservation ordinance to property owned by a non-
profit corporation does not constitute a taking unless the appli-
cation of the ordinance prevents or seriously interferes with the
corporation's carrying out its charitable purpose.32 Sailors' Snug
Harbor involved the designation of a group of Greek revival dor-
mitories and a chapel as landmarks pursuant to the New York
City Landmarks Preservation Law. The buildings in question
occupied a small part of an eighty acre site that was owned by
Sailors' Snug Harbor, a charitable trust established many years
ago to provide a home for retired seamen. Sailors' Snug Harbor
challenged the designation because they desired to demolish the
landmark structures, which admittedly were outmoded for use
as dormitories, and to replace them with a modern facility on
the same site. The property owned by Sailors' Snug Harbor was
large enough to accommodate both the newly planned facility
and the existing landmark structures. The plaintiff's position
was merely that the presence of the existing structures would
19811
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interfere with the magnificent views of the harbor from the new
facility and that the trust could not afford to maintain the
landmarks.
The Appellate Division reversed the lower court's voiding of
the landmark designation and remanded the matter for further
factual findings regarding the use that might be made of the
structures and the cost of maintaining them. The task before the
court in Sailors' Snug Harbor was to assess the application of
the New York City Landmarks Preservation Law to property
owned by a charitable trust. In doing so, the court adopted the
general rule that regulation does not constitute a taking in this
context if the property can be used for any reasonable use which
meets the needs of the particular nonprofit corporation.
The court noted that the New York City ordinance explic-
itly utilizes the "reasonable return on investment" test as a
guide to determining when commercial property is deprived of
all use for which it is suited and, therefore, has been the subject
of a taking. The court, however, wisely recognized that such a
test is manifestly inappropriate for property used for charitable
purposes. Obviously, property would be of no use to a charitable
organization if it could not be used in furtherance of the organi-
zation's charitable activities even if the property could produce
income if used for some entirely extraneous purpose. If the abil-
ity of the property to produce income, alone, were sufficient to
render constitutional the regulation of charitable property, such
regulation could effectively force the charity to sell its property
to someone who was interested in its profit-making potential.
Arguably, such a constructively forced sale could amount to a
taking.3 3 The court in Sailors' Snug Harbor avoided this di-
lemma by devising a test that looked only to whether the regula-
tion allowed the public benefit organization to put its property
to any use that would reasonably advance the organization's
charitable objectives; the test did not look to whether the prop-
erty could be used for some income-producing purpose regard-
less of the owner's charitable activities. The Appellate Division
expressed the test as whether "maintenance of the landmark [as
required by the ordinance] physically or financially prevents or
seriously interferes with carrying out the [owner's] charitable
purpose.""
The Appellate Division's instructions to the lower court on
[Vol. 1:635
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remand clearly indicate that the court intended the test it de-
vised for property owned by nonprofit organizations to be ap-
plied with the same liberal attitude that has characterized the
review of the application of zoning ordinances to commercial
property. Specifically, the instruction that the lower court deter-
mine "whether the buildings are capable of conversion to a use-
ful purpose without excessive cost"8 establishes that the test is
whether the regulation allows the property to be put to any use
that advances the owner's charitable purpose, not whether the
ordinance interferes with the use to which the property pres-
ently is being put or whether the present use furthers the rele-
vant charitable objectives. This approach is completely in accord
with the view that commercial property has not been the subject
of a taking if the regulation allows the property to be utilized for
any purpose that would produce a reasonable return on invest-
ment, regardless of whether the property presently produces an
adequate return."
The New York State Court of Appeals explicitly adopted
the Sailors' Snug Harbor test in Lutheran Church in America v.
City of New York, 87 stating that the rule which would invalidate
a landmark designation only when it "would prevent or seriously
interfere with the carrying out of the charitable purpose. . . is a
simple enough concept and ought to apply. . . ."" The Court of
Appeals, however, applied the test so restrictively that the result
reached was inconsistent both with the spirit of the rule as an-
nounced in Sailors' Snug Harbor and with the precedents apply-
ing the "reasonable use" test to commercial property.
Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York involved
the landmark designation of the former Morgan mansion in mid-
town Manhattan. At the time of the designation, the mansion
was owned by the Lutheran Church and used for administrative
offices, as it had been for twenty years. The Lutheran Church
challenged the application of the New York City Landmarks
Preservation Law to its property because it intended to demol-
ish the structure and replace it with a larger building on the
same site. The Court of Appeals accepted the Lutheran Church's
arguments that the application of the New York City
Landmarks Preservation Law to the Church's property pre-
vented the Church from continuing to use that site for its ad-
ministrative offices, that the Landmarks Law seriously inter-
1981]
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fered with the Church's carrying out of its charitable purposes,
and that the application of the Landmarks Law to the Morgan
mansion amounted to an uncompensated taking in violation of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
In reaching this result, the Court of Appeals reiterated the
familiar principles that the police power allows the government
to impose noncompensable regulations on private property, but
that such regulation is invalid if it is so onerous as to be confis-
catory, and that the application of a regulation is confiscatory if
the owner "is deprived of reasonable use of its land."' 9 In spite
of the holding, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the principle
that landmark preservation statutes which prohibit the demoli-
tion of designated landmarks are not confiscatory on their face
and, as stated above, acknowledged that the appropriate test of
when the regulation of charitable property constitutes a taking
is whether the regulation prevents or seriously interferes with
the owner's carrying out its charitable purposes.40
The facts before the court, however, were governed, in the
view of the Court of Appeals, by precedents such as Vernon
Park Realty, Inc. v. City of Mount Vernon41 and Morris County
Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy
Hills,4 which hold an invalid taking occurs when private prop-
erty is zoned so that it can be used solely for public purposes.
Those cases could easily have been factually distinguished: each
involved ordinances that prohibited the relevant property from
being put to any private use, while the New York City
Landmarks Preservation Law allowed the Lutheran Church to
use the Morgan mansion for any purpose it chose. Instead, the
court held that the city had invalidly added the Morgan man-
sion to the city's inventory of tourist attractions through regula-
tion, rather than through condemnation.43
The court's restrictive decision was principally influenced
by the Lutheran Church's argument that the landmark designa-
tion prevented the Church from continuing to use the mansion
for administrative offices. Accepting that factual argument, the
court held that the case was controlled by a rule that the appli-
cation of a zoning ordinance is void if it prohibits the "use to
which the property is devoted at the time of the enactment of
the ordinance. '44 Even if one accepts the court's factual deter-
mination, which appears to be strained," the court's analysis
[Vol. 1:635
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conflicts with the Supreme Court's recent dictum in the Penn
Central case that the application of a zoning ordinance may be
valid even when the ordinance effectively prohibits the use to
which the property has been put in the past,4 6 and also conflicts
with venerable Supreme Court cases, such as Hadacheck v. Se-
bastian4 7 and Goldblatt v. City of Hempstead," both cited in
the Penn Central case. The court's analysis also conflicts with
both the opinion in Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt4 9
and the commercial property cases that look to whether the reg-
ulated property may be put to any reasonable use.'0 After all,
Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt was remanded for the
lower court to determine if the landmarks economically could be
converted to any use in furtherance of the owner's charitable
functions, not merely to determine whether the buildings could
be remodeled to serve as modern dormitories, which they appar-
ently could not." If the same approach had been applied in the
Lutheran Church case, the court would have looked to see if the
Morgan mansion could have been used for any of the Church's
charitable activities, not just whether the building could be used
for offices.
The landmark designation of the Morgan mansion might
have been saved if the City had granted the Lutheran Church
economic relief such as transferable development rights approxi-
mating the unused air space over the landmark site.'2 Appar-
ently no such relief was offered. The New York City Landmarks
Preservation Law has been construed to empower the landmarks
commission to provide such relief for charitable properties, not-
withstanding the ordinance's silence on the matter.'8 Further-
more, the Supreme Court recently stated that transferable de-
velopment rights are valuable and held that such rights should
be considered when determining whether a landmark preserva-
tion ordinance allows an owner to make reasonable use of its
property." Conceivably, the transfer or sale of development
rights could have enabled the Church to acquire additional office
space which, together with the existing offices in the Morgan
mansion, would have satisfied the Church's needs.
In contrast to the Lutheran Church decision, the Common-
wealth Court of Pennsylvania took a very liberal approach in
First Presbyterian Church of York v. City Council of City of
York," one of the few other reported decisions addressing the
1981]
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issue of when the application of a landmark preservation ordi-
nance to property owned by a charitable organization constitutes
a taking. In that case, the court upheld the landmark designa-
tion of a Victorian house which the York Presbyterian Church
wanted to demolish to make space for additional church park-
ing. It did so by employing the general rule that the application
of an ordinance is valid if it permits any reasonable use of the
property. The Pennsylvania court acknowledged the existence of
the Sailors' Snug Harbor test but did not consider it to be a
specific formulation of a general rule necessarily applicable to
property owned by public benefit organizations. Rather, the
Pennsylvania court considered the "reasonable use" test to be a
more liberal test that governs the application of landmark pres-
ervation ordinances to all property within landmark districts, re-
gardless of whether the property is owned by nonprofit groups or
profit-making corporations. The Sailors' Snug Harbor test, a
more restrictive test, was, in the view of the Pennsylvania court,
applicable to individual landmark sites which were not part of
historic districts. Since the property in question was located in
an historic district, the court looked to see if the ordinance pre-
cluded the property from being put to any reasonable use, re-
gardless of whether that use was relevant to the owner's charita-
ble purpose. The court specifically stated that the church could
not prevail because it "did not show that the sale of the prop-
erty was impracticable, that commercial rental could not provide
a reasonable rate of return, or that other potential use of the
property was foreclosed."5 In addition, the court noted that the
church had also not satisfied the more restrictive Sailors' Snug
Harbor test by failing to prove that the building was incapable
of being used for church purposes.
The court's decision was based on its factual analysis of two
precedents, Maher v. City of New Orleans57 and Trustees of
Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt." The court construed the two
cases as imposing two distinct standards, instead of imposing
two variations of the same standard. The court then focused on
the fact that the property in Maher was located in a landmark
district and the property in Sailors' Snug Harbor was not,
rather than on the fact that the Sailors' Snug Harbor property
was owned by a charitable organization while the Maher prop-
erty was owned by an individual who wished to use it for com-
[Vol. 1:635
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mercial purposes.
The distinction between landmark districts and individual
landmark sites has been invoked in numerous challenges to the
designation of individual landmarks. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, recently rejected that distinction in Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City when it upheld the application
of the New York City Landmarks Preservation Law to Grand
Central Station, an individual landmark.5 9 There the Supreme
Court held that the designation of individual landmarks was not
spot zoning, reasoning that such regulation involves a sharing of
burdens and benefits analogous to the operation of traditional
zoning ordinances that cover entire districts."
The important distinction between property owned by pub-
lic benefit organizations and that owned by commercial inter-
ests, however, recently was confirmed by a Missouri court in
Dempsey v. Boys' Club of the City of St. Louis, Inc., the re-
maining case dealing, albeit in dictum, with the question of
when the application of a landmark preservation ordinance to
property owned by a nonprofit organization becomes a taking.2
In that case, the court implicitly advocated adopting the Sailors'
Snug Harbor test when it explained how the literal application
of the "reasonable use" test to charitable property, as advocated
in First Presbyterian Church of York v. City Council of City of
York,63 could result in injustice. The court correctly observed
that:
• . . considerations of a commercial nature applicable to inves-
tors or others engaged in the rental business may be deemed in-
appropriate by a benevolent or humanitarian organization seeking
a permit to demolish property in order to carry out and promote
its chartered objectives and purposes;... to deny such a request
may effectively deprive such an organization of any practical use
or benefit of ownership, and that in conceivable circumstances
such a denial might be considered to constitute a taking of pri-
vate property for public use."
The eminently reasonable test announced in Trustees of
Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt resolves the problem highlighted
by the foregoing quote. As demonstrated above, the case law
that has developed in the context of commercial property sup-
ports the general adoption of that test, as well as its liberal
application.
1981]
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Despite the authorities discussed in this paper, however, the
issue of when the application of a landmark preservation ordi-
nance to property owned by a charitable organization becomes
an invalid taking remains virtually a question of first impression
in most jurisdictions. The answer will be molded by future
litigation.
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